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Cooperative Approaches to Managing Social Responsibility in
Supply Chains: Joint Auditing and Information Sharing
Xin Fang  Soo-Haeng Cho1
Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University
Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University
xfang@smu.edu.sg  soohaeng@andrew.cmu.edu
Abstract: The incidents of safety, labor and environmental violations in recent years have com-
pelled many rms to rethink their approaches to managing suppliers. This paper investigates two
cooperative approaches that are used in practice: auditing a common supplier jointly ("joint audit-
ing") and sharing independent audit results with other rms ("information sharing"). We develop
a model based on a cooperative game in partition function form that captures both competitive
and cooperative interactions among rms. Our analysis shows that, although there has been some
concern about cooperation for fear of compromising a competitive advantage, rms have incentives
to cooperate in managing their suppliers when the negative externality of one rms social respon-
sibility violation on other rms is high. However, when the negative externality is low, rms do
not have incentives for joint auditing (unless audits are very costly), nor do they have incentives
for information sharing. Our analysis further reveals that, contrary to common belief, neither co-
operative approach necessarily improves social responsibility, especially when one rm can benet
from otherssocial responsibility violations (i.e., the positive externality is high). This is because
cooperation reduces competitive intensity among rms, who then underinvest in audits under the
high positive externality. Finally, even if agreement is not reached for cooperation before conduct-
ing individual audits, social responsibility can still be improved by incentivizing rms with better
information to share their private information with others. To facilitate such ex-post cooperation,
we propose a prot-allocation scheme among rms, and specify the amount of subsidy a third-party
organization should provide.
Key words: Cooperative Game, Social Responsibility, Supply Chain Management
1 Introduction
A building that housed several garment factories in Bangladesh collapsed into a deadly heap on
April 24, 2013, only ve months after a horric re at a similar facility (Manik and Yardley 2013).
The factories were producing garments for major American and European brands such as Mango,
Benetton, Primark, and Walmart. Substandard construction and inadequate safety protocols were
the major causes of the accident, and in the aftermath of the disaster, media attention focused
1The authors are grateful to seminar participants at the 2013 INFORMS annual meeting, the 2014 POMS an-
nual conference, the 2015 INFORMS annual meeting, Carnegie Mellon University, University of Oregon, Singapore
Management University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Fudan University, The Hong Kong University of Science
& Technology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Queens University, Temple University, University of Illinois
at Chicago, University of Rochester, Imperial College London, London Business School, and Nanyang Technological
University. This work is part of Xin Fangs Ph.D. dissertation led in May 2014.
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on the rms who knowingly sourced products from the factories that maintained such poor safety
conditions (Al-Mahmood et al. 2013).
With numerous rms procuring their materials and parts worldwide and outsourcing their
manufacturing functions to overseas suppliers, there are many similar cases in which brand-name
rms source from overseas suppliers who violate safety, labor or environmental standards. For
example, Nike and Adidas were criticized by the public for their suppliers labor practices, including
low wages, excessive working hours, and child labor (Nisen 2013, Burke 2000). Apple, HP, and Sony
were recently accused of sourcing from suppliers with environmental violations (Mozur and Dou
2013). When a social responsibility violation of a rms supplier is revealed, the scandal damages
the rms brand, and the negative press surrounding the violation leads consumers to switch to
competitors (Guo et al. 2015, Plambeck and Taylor 2015). Therefore, it is crucial for rms to
manage the social responsibility of their suppliers.
Many believe that audits are the best deterrence to supplier risks (Grocery Manufacturers
Association (GMA) 2010). Firms can inspect their suppliersproduction facilities to ensure that
production can and will only proceed in a socially responsible manner (Beil 2010). If a supplier fails
an audit from a rm, he may lose business from that rm (Egels-Zandén 2007, Lee et al. 2012). This
creates incentives for suppliers to conduct production responsibly, especially in emerging economies
where regulation and law enforcement are weak. However, audits are not perfect solutions for rms
to manage supplier risks. If an audit is not properly conducted, it can be a box-ticking exercise
instead of an investigative process, so that it is not di¢ cult for suppliers with sub-par standards to
pass (CEB Procurement & Operations 2014). Furthermore, an audit can be very costly for manu-
facturers. A comprehensive audit requires hiring full-time employees, providing them with years of
training, and ensuring them to have su¢ cient time and resources to investigate suppliers (Cli¤ord
and Greenhouse 2013). In the pharmaceutical and biotech industry, some suppliers even charge fees
for on-site audits according to the survey conducted by RX-360, an international pharmaceutical
supply chain consortium, on its member rms (Gordon 2009).
In order to improve the accuracy of audits and reduce audit costs, several rms have started
to cooperate with each other in managing their common suppliers. There are two approaches of
cooperation that have been implemented. First, under the approach referred to as joint auditing,
multiple rms pool their resources to conduct an audit jointly on their common supplier instead of
each conducting an audit individually. For example, after tragic Bangladesh res, global apparel
brands formed the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh and the Alliance of Bangladesh
Worker Safety to jointly establish a safety program and conduct factory audits in Bangladesh
(Thomasson 2014). In the pharmaceutical industry, major rms across the world, including Johnson
& Johnson, GlaxoSmithKline and Bayer, have formed the Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Initiative
(PSCI) to conduct joint audits on their suppliers (PSCI 2014). Since audit costs are shared among
manufacturers, the cost incurred by an individual manufacturer is reduced under joint auditing.
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Second, under the approach referred to as information sharing,rms share the results from the
audits that they conduct on their suppliers individually. For example, Rx-360 provides a platform
for its members to share audit reports with each other (RX-360 2014). With the results from
multiple audits, manufacturers may obtain better information about supplierspractices.
Despite of the apparent benets of joint auditing and information sharing, there have been
concerns about cooperation for fear of compromising a competitive advantage (GMA 2010). As
such, industrywide cooperation, like the examples mentioned above, is not very common. It is un-
clear whether rms always have incentives to collaborate with their direct competitors in managing
suppliers or even to share their private information about suppliers. Also, it is unclear whether
such cooperation will eventually improve social responsibility because a reduction in audit costs or
sharing of audit results may reduce rmsincentives to invest their resources in auditing.
The objective of this paper is to investigate rmsincentives to cooperate and the e¤ectiveness of
such cooperation in improving social responsibility. Our specic research questions are as follows:
(Q1) Do competing manufacturers always have incentives to conduct joint audits or share their
private information from individual audits? If not, how can we design a prot-allocation scheme
or a subsidy from a third-party organization to motivate cooperation among manufacturers? (Q2)
Does joint auditing or information sharing guarantee improvement in social responsibility? If not,
under what condition does joint auditing or information sharing improve social responsibility, and
which cooperative approach performs better?
To answer these questions, we develop an analytical model in which several manufacturers
potentially source a part from a common supplier.2 Our model is based on a cooperative game
in partition function form, which enables us to develop insights into the incentives of competing
manufacturers to cooperate in the presence of both negative and positive externalities. Specically,
(1) Incentives of competing manufacturers to cooperate: Social responsibility violations of a supplier
may a¤ect multiple manufacturers who share that supplier. This creates incentives for competing
manufacturers to cooperate in managing their supplier. For example, the Accord on Fire and
Building Safety in Bangladesh involves more than 220 apparel brands (Smith 2016).
(2) Negative and positive externalities of social responsibility violations: On the one hand, a social
responsibility violation that involves one manufacturer may have a negative externality on other
manufacturers. This may happen when consumers lose condence in the whole market and as-
sociate the violation with other manufacturers as well (Roehm and Tybout 2006). For example,
Bangladesh res created concerns for poor safety conditions in other factories in Bangladesh and
other developing countries (Mestrich 2014). On the other hand, a social responsibility violation
may have a positive externality if consumers switch from the manufacturer involved in the violation
to other manufacturers who have better social responsibility standards (Guo et al. 2015). For
2For ease of exposition, a downstream rm who sources a part from an upstream supplier is referred to as a
manufacturer, but it can be a retailer as well. Similarly, the part can be material or a nished good.
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example, British shoppers increased spending on ethically sourced Fairtrade products after several
scandals (Lucas 2013).
Our analysis shows that, although there has been some concern about cooperation for fear
of compromising a competitive advantage, manufacturers have incentives to voluntarily cooperate
through joint auditing and information sharing when the negative externality is high. This explains
the formation of the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, the Alliance of Bangladesh
Worker Safety, and the initiatives in the pharmaceutical industry. In these examples, a fatal accident
can potentially have ripple e¤ects beyond a single rm. We also nd that cooperation serves as a
win-win solution in this case for both manufacturers and consumers by increasing prots and social
responsibility simultaneously. Furthermore, the formation of multiple coalitions such as the Accord
and the Alliance makes joint auditing more e¤ective than a single industrywide coalition.
However, when the negative externality is low, manufacturers have little incentives to cooperate
in managing their suppliers even with the substantial risk of social responsibility violations. This is
the case when consumers are less sensitive to responsibility violations; for example, no cooperative
initiative has been undertaken to address the environmental violations mentioned earlier which
involved Apple, HP, and Sony. For this case, our result suggests that a third-party organization
such as a government agency or an industry association should intervene, and o¤er an incentive-
compatible mechanism to facilitate industry cooperation. We propose such a mechanism that
reallocates prots among manufacturers and species the minimum amount of subsidy that a third-
party organization needs to provide.
Finally, our analysis reveals, contrary to common belief, that industry cooperation does not
necessarily improve social responsibility, especially when one rm can benet from otherssocial
responsibility violations (i.e., the positive externality of a social responsibility violation is high).
This is because cooperation reduces the intensity of competition among manufacturers, and man-
ufacturers reduce their audit e¤orts signicantly under joint auditing or information sharing when
the positive externality is high. Thus, caution must be taken to monitor manufacturers audit
e¤orts when joint auditing or information sharing is implemented in the market where competition
is erce and consumers switch easily. When comparing the e¤ectiveness of joint auditing with
that of information sharing, we nd that when the risk of social responsibility violations is high,
information sharing is more e¤ective than joint auditing (and vice versa). The reason is that when
anticipating higher risk, manufacturers choose higher audit e¤orts for their individual audits. This
makes audits more informative so that information sharing, which leverages the value of the infor-
mation from individual audits, becomes more e¤ective. In this case, information sharing can be
used as a starting point of cooperation in managing social responsibility.
2 Related Literature
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This paper is related to the nascent literature on socially-responsible operations and to a stream
of research that applies cooperative game theory to rmsoperational decisions.
The literature on socially-responsible operations studies various challenges rms face in manag-
ing sustainable production and supply chain issues. Our work is particularly relevant to a stream
of research that studies the management of suppliers in decentralized supply chains to improve
social responsibility. Several papers in this stream examine various means such as contract penalty,
inspection, and certication to induce a supplier to exert high e¤ort for quality improvement (e.g.,
Baiman et al. (2000), Hwang et al. (2006), Chao et al. (2009), Chen and Deng (2013), Lewis
et al. (2015)). Babich and Tang (2012) investigate a mechanism with deferred payments to im-
prove product safety, and Rui and Lai (2012) extend it to broader settings. Chen and Lee (2014)
examine screening mechanisms to distinguish suppliers with di¤erent ethical levels, and Guo et
al. (2015) analyze the sourcing decision of a buyer choosing between a responsible supplier and a
risky supplier. Xu et al. (2015), Plambeck and Taylor (2015), Chen et al. (2015), and Huang et
al. (2015a) study the e¤ectiveness of supplier audits conducted by rms and NGOs to mitigate
suppliersviolation of social responsibility in various settings.
Whereas a typical setup in these prior papers involves only one manufacturer, our paper studies
cooperation among multiple manufacturers to induce a supplier to behave in a socially responsible
manner. Our model of cooperation captures externalities among multiple manufacturers, so that
a violation incident of one manufacturer not only a¤ects her own prot, but also has an impact
on other manufacturersprots. Although Caro et al. (2015), which is written in parallel to us,
address the same topic of joint auditing and information sharing as this paper, they consider two
monopolistic manufacturers with no externalities. They conclude that both joint auditing and
ex-ante information sharing are always more e¤ective than individual auditing in terms of the
suppliers compliance. In contrast, using cooperative game theory, our paper analyzes cooperation
among more than two competing manufacturers in the presence of externalities, and shows that
both cooperative approaches are not always e¤ective. Furthermore, our results suggest that, in the
absence of externalities, all manufacturers always have incentives to cooperate, yet we do not observe
such industrywide cooperation in many markets. Thus, we examine the e¤ect of externalities on
manufacturersincentives to cooperate, and develop insights into when and how to motivate them
to cooperate through joint auditing and information sharing. Finally, we nd that even if ex-ante
agreement is not reached for joint auditing or information sharing, social responsibility can still be
improved through ex-post information sharing among manufacturers under the incentive-compatible
mechanism we propose.
In order to examine manufacturersincentives to cooperate, we apply cooperative game theory.
Cooperative game theory has been applied to various operational problems, including inventory
transshipment (e.g., Granot and Soi´c 2003, Fang and Cho 2014), decentralized assembly systems
(e.g., Granot and Yin 2008, Nagarajan and Soi´c. 2009, Yin 2010), group buying (e.g., Chen and
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Yin 2010, Nagarajan et al. 2010), capacity allocation and scheduling (e.g., Hall and Liu 2010), risk
sharing alliances (Huang et al. 2015b), and product recycling (Gui et al. 2015). Most papers in
this literature use a cooperative game in ordinal function form, under which the prot generated by
a coalition depends only on the actions chosen by members of the coalition. Instead, we employ a
cooperative game in partition function form to model the externalities of violation incidents which
are a¤ected by the audit e¤orts of both members and non-members of each coalition.
In sum, our paper contributes to the literature on socially-responsible supply chain management
by examining the incentives and e¤ectiveness of cooperative approaches to managing a supplier. We
employ a cooperative game in partition function form and highlight a crucial role of externalities
in rmsincentives to cooperate.
3 Model
We consider a supply chain in which a supplier (he) provides a part (which can also be material
or a nal good) to a set of manufacturers (she). Let N = f1; 2; :::; ng denote a set of manu-
facturers, where n is the total number of manufacturers. In §3.1, we present the base model in
which manufacturers do not cooperate in managing the supplier. In §3.2, we consider two forms of
cooperation: joint auditing or information sharing. Our notation is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Summary of Key Notation
Symbol Denition
N Set of manufacturers; N = f1; 2; :::; ng; where n is the number of manufacturers
i Index for a manufacturer; i 2 N
a Indicator of whether a supplier produces the part irresponsibly(= 1) or responsibly (= 0)
 Probability of social responsibility violation;  2 [0; 1]
r Suppliers prot from selling a part produced responsibly to a manufacturer; r > 0
g Suppliers additional prot from selling a part produced irresponsibly; g > 0
si Indicator of whether a supplier fails manufacturer is audit (= 1) or not (= 0)
ei Audit e¤ort of manufacturer i; ei 2 [0; 1]
c; x Audit cost parameters; c; x > 0
l Additional cost when a manufacturer procures a part from a backup supplier; l > 0
zi Indicator of whether manufacturer is issue is revealed to consumers (= 1) or not (= 0)
 Probability of the revelation of social responsibility violation;  2 [0; 1]
qi Indicator of manufacturer is social responsibility violation; qi = zi(a  si)
i Gross prot of manufacturer i with no social responsibility violation; i > 0
 Degree of the negative externality;  > 0
 Degree of the positive externality;  > 0
3.1 Base Model without Cooperation
In the base model, each manufacturer conducts an audit on the supplier individually to decide
whether or not to source the part from the supplier. The supplier can choose to produce the part
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responsibly or irresponsibly to save costs (e.g., paying low wages, using cheap facilities involving
safety or environmental risks). We denote by a = 0 the case when the supplier produces the part
responsibly, and denote by a = 1 the case when the supplier produces it irresponsibly. Dene the
suppliers probability of a social responsibility violation as  = P (a = 1): The supplier may adopt
a pure strategy of either producing the part responsibly (i.e.,  = 0) or irresponsibly (i.e.,  = 1),
or adopt a mixed strategy of choosing  2 (0; 1).
Before sourcing the part from the supplier, each manufacturer i audits the supplier indepen-
dently. Let si = 1 (si = 0) represent the case when the supplier fails (passes) manufacturer is
audit. When the supplier produces the part responsibly, he passes the audits of all manufacturers;
i.e., P (si = 1ja = 0) = 0 for all i 2 N . When the supplier produces the part irresponsibly, he
fails manufacturer is audit with a probability ei = P (si = 1ja = 1), where ei 2 [0; 1]. Each
manufacturer i decides on the probability ei, called audit e¤ort, without the knowledge of 
chosen by the supplier, and incurs an audit cost C(ei). We assume an exponential cost function,
C(ei) = c(1  ei) x where c; x > 0; which is increasing and convex. Parameter x captures the de-
gree of convexity in the cost function. This cost function suggests that an audit does not generate
perfect information (i.e., ei < 1). A similar function has been used in the literature (e.g., Huang
et al. 2015a). Our qualitative insights continue to hold with other cost functions such as a power
cost function C(ei) = cexi where x  1 (e.g., Plambeck and Taylor 2015).
If the supplier passes manufacturer is audit, the supplier can sell the part to manufacturer
i. Let r (> 0) denote the suppliers prot from selling the part produced responsibly to one
manufacturer, and let g (> 0) denote the suppliers additional prot from selling the part produced
irresponsibly. Although the supplier can lower his cost by cutting corners, he will not be able to
sell the part to manufacturers when he fails their audits. The expected prot of the supplier can
then be expressed as
E0 = nr   
 
r
X
i2N
ei   g
!
; (1)
where the second term represents the expected cost of a social responsibility violation to the sup-
plier. If the supplier fails manufacturer is audit, then he cannot sell his part to manufacturer i. In
this case, we assume that manufacturer i procures the part from a backup supplier with additional
cost l ( 0); who always produces his product in a responsible manner.3
The suppliers violation of social responsibility can result in a loss of prot to manufacturers.
Existing models in the literature reviewed in §2 deal with a single manufacturer who may lose a
part of her prot (in particular, due to the loss of socially conscious customers) when the suppliers
violation is disclosed to the public. A main departure of our model from those existing models is
3Guo et al. (2014) study a manufacturers decision to choose between a reliable supplier and a risky supplier,
in which a reliable supplier has zero responsibility risk. Likewise, we assume for simplicity that a back-up supplier
involves no risk of a social responsibility violation.
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Figure 1: Manufacturer is involvement with a social responsibility violation (qi) that depends on
the violation of the supplier (a), the audit result from manufacturer i (si), and the chance of the
violation being revealed to consumers (zi).
that a social responsibility violation of one manufacturer not only a¤ects her own prot, but also
has an impact on other manufacturersprots.
To model such externalities, we introduce a variable qi which indicates whether or not manufac-
turer i is involved with a social responsibility violation. If the supplier produces the part responsibly
or the violation is detected during manufacturer is audit (i.e., a = si = 0 or a = si = 1), then
manufacturer i does not face any social responsibility risk, so we set qi = 0. In contrast, if the sup-
plier produces the part irresponsibly but he passes manufacturer is audit (i.e., a = 1 and si = 0),
then there is a potential risk that the social responsibility violation will be revealed to consumers.
We assume this will occur with probability  and denote this scenario by zi = 1. We denote by
zi = 0 the scenario that the social responsibility violation will not be revealed to consumers. Taken
together, we can dene qi = zi(a  si): Figure 1 illustrates the value of qi under di¤erent scenarios.
Let i (> 0) represent manufacturer is gross prot in the market with no social responsibility
violation. Using the indicator variable qi, manufacturer is prot i can be expressed as
i = (1  )i + 
8<:i   qi + ! X
j2Nnfig
qj   sil
9=;  C(ei); (2)
where the rst term is manufacturer is prot when the supplier produces the part responsibly with
probability (1  ), the second term is her prot when the supplier produces the part irresponsibly
with probability , and the last term C(ei) is the audit cost. In the second term,  (> 0) represents a
direct loss due to manufacturer is own social responsibility violation, ! (2 R) represents a potential
increase or decrease in manufacturer is prot due to each of other manufacturersviolations, and
l is the additional cost when manufacturer i sources the part from the backup supplier.
As discussed in §1, one manufacturers social responsibility violation has two distinct impacts on
other manufacturers. On the one hand, it may reduce the demands of other products in the market
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through the negative externality because consumers may lose condence in the whole market. On
the other hand, consumers may switch from a product involved in a social responsibility violation
to other products, creating the positive externality. The existence of these externalities has been
conrmed empirically in the previous literature (e.g., Roehm and Tybout 2006, Janakiraman et
al. 2009). In order to isolate the impact of each type of externalities on manufacturersprots, we
rewrite (2) as
i = (1  )i + 

i   
P
j2N qj
n
+ 
P
j2N qj
n
  qi

  sil

  C(ei); (3)
where    + !   n! (> 0) and    + ! (> 0) capture the degree of the negative external-
ity and the degree of the positive externality, respectively, in the following sense. First, the term

P
j2N qj=n increases with the number of manufacturers involved in social responsibility viola-
tions in the market. The more products from such manufacturers in the market, the larger loss
in the prot for manufacturer i. Thus, this term captures the negative externality of one manu-
facturers social responsibility violation on other manufacturers in the market. Second, the term
(
P
j2N qj=n   qi); which captures the positive externality, increases with the di¤erence between
the average level of social responsibility among all manufacturers in the market and manufacturer
is own level. This term will be positive (negative) when manufacturer is level is lower (higher)
than the average of competitorslevels; in other words, there will be an increase in the prot due
to consumers who will switch from other manufacturers involved in social responsibility violations
to manufacturer i.4 To illustrate, suppose, for example, that the supplier had produced his part
irresponsibly, and that only manufacturer 1 among four manufacturers in the market detected the
violation and switched to the backup supplier. If the social responsibility violations of manufactur-
ers 2; 3; and 4 are revealed to consumers (i.e., q1 = 0 and q2 = q3 = q4 = 1), then manufacturers
prots are: 1 = 1  34+ 34  l C(ei) and i = i  34  14 C(ei) for i = 2; 3; and 4. We as-
sume that when a manufacturer detects the suppliers violation, the benets from the externalities
are large enough to cover the extra cost of the backup supplier (i.e.,   l and   l).
Finally, noting that the expected value of qi conditional on the suppliers violation (i.e., a = 1)
is (1   ei), we obtain the following Ei by taking the expectation of i in (3) with respect to qj
and sj for j 2 N :
Ei = (1  )i + 

i   

1 
P
j2N ej
n

+ 

ei  
P
j2N ej
n

  eil

  C(ei): (4)
3.2 Two Forms of Cooperation: Joint Auditing or Information Sharing
Suppose manufacturers cooperate in managing their common supplier. For generality, we do not
require that each manufacturer cooperates with all other manufacturers, but instead we assume
4Alternatively, we may write i = (1   )i + 
n
i   0
P
j2Nnfig qj
n
+ 0
P
j2Nnfig qj
n
  qi

  sil
o
  C(ei); in
which manufacturer i is excluded in
P
j2Nnfig qj
n
: Qualitative insights do not change with this alternative formulation.
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Figure 2: Two coalitions in the market with four manufacturers: (a) joint auditing, and (b) infor-
mation sharing.
that every manufacturer belongs to one coalition of which the size can be between 1 and n. Let m
( n) denote the number of coalitions in the market, and let Bk (where k = 1; 2; :::;m) denote a
coalition. Dene a coalition structure B = fB1; B2; :::; Bmg as a set of coalitions. We write i 2 Bk
if manufacturer i belongs to coalition Bk. We next describe how manufacturers can collaborate
through joint auditing or information sharing, respectively. See Figure 2 for illustration.
Under joint auditing, manufacturers in coalition Bk jointly decide audit e¤ort eBk and obtain
result sBk from the joint audit. The cost of this joint audit is C(eBk): There are three possible
scenarios. First, if the supplier chooses to produce the part responsibly, then he will pass the audit
and therefore all manufacturers i in Bk will face no social responsibility risk (i.e., qi = 0 8i 2 Bk).
Second, if the supplier chooses to produce the part irresponsibly but fails the joint audit of Bk (i.e.,
a = 1 and sBk = 1), then all manufacturers in Bk will not source the part from the supplier (i.e.,
qi = 0 8i 2 Bk). Lastly, if the supplier chooses to produce the part irresponsibly and passes the
joint audit of Bk (i.e., a = 1 and sBk = 0), then all manufacturers in Bk will face the risk of social
responsibility violations being revealed (i.e., qi = 0 with probability 1    or 1 with probability 
8i 2 Bk). Since the audit e¤ort is determined by a coalition instead of an individual manufacturer,
we consider the total expected prot of manufacturers in Bk; which is obtained by aggregating the
prots in (4) over all manufacturers in Bk as follows:
EBk = (1  )
X
i2Bk
i + 
8<:X
i2Bk
i   nk

1 
Pm
h=1 nheBh
n

+ nk

eBk  
Pm
h=1 nheBh
n

 nkeBk lg   C(eBk); (5)
where nk is the number of manufacturers in Bk and
Pm
h=1 nheBh=n represents the average audit
e¤ort across all manufacturers.
Under information sharing, each manufacturer i decides her own audit e¤ort ei as in the base
model, but manufacturers in coalition Bk share the results from their individual audits with other
manufacturers in Bk. As in joint auditing, if the supplier chooses to produce the part responsibly,
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then every manufacturer i in Bk will face no social responsibility risk (i.e., qi = 0 8i 2 Bk).
Now suppose the supplier has chosen to produce the part irresponsibly. In this case, if at least
one manufacturer j 2 Bk detects the suppliers violation (i.e., sj = 1), then any manufacturer i
in the same coalition Bk will learn this audit result and will not source from the supplier (i.e.,
qi = zi(a max
j2Bk
sj) = 0 8i 2 Bk); otherwise, all manufacturers in Bk will face the risk of violations
being revealed. Individual audits are conducted independently, so the probability that the supplier
who produces the part irresponsibly fails at least one audit in Bk is given by 1  
Y
i2Bk
(1   ei):
Since each manufacturer decides her audit e¤ort independently to maximize her own prot instead
of the total prot of the coalition, we consider the expected prot of manufacturer i in Bk given as
Ei;Bk = (1  )i   C(ei) + 
264i   
8><>:1 
mX
h=1

1 
Y
j2Bh
(1  ej)

nh
n
9>=>; (6)
+
8><>:
0@1  Y
j2Bk
(1  ej)
1A  mX
h=1

1 
Y
j2Bh
(1  ej)

nh
n
9>=>; 
0@1  Y
j2Bk
(1  ej)
1A l
375 :
4 Analysis
As a benchmark, we rst analyze the base model without cooperation in §4.1. We then compare
its results with those under joint auditing or information sharing in §4.2. We use superscript (0)
to indicate equilibrium for the base model, (1) for joint auditing, and (2) for information sharing.
4.1 Analysis of the Base Model without Cooperation
In the base model without cooperation, the supplier decides on the probability of social responsibil-
ity violation, and each manufacturer decides on her audit e¤ort independently. Since manufacturers
cannot observe the suppliers decision, a game between the supplier and manufacturers is a simul-
taneous game in which every rm makes a decision, anticipating the best response of other rms
to his/her decision. In the following, we rst consider the best response of manufacturers and then
that of the supplier.
From manufacturer is expected prot given in (4), if the supplier chooses to produce the part
responsibly (i.e.,  = 0), then the optimal audit e¤orts of all manufacturers are equal to zero. If
the supplier produces the part irresponsibly with probability  > 0, we can obtain the following
optimal audit e¤ort of manufacturer i by solving the rst-order condition of (4)5:
e
(0)
i () = 1 

[+ (n  1)  nl]
cxn
  1
x+1
: (7)
From (7), we observe that for any given violation probability ; the manufacturer would increase
her audit e¤ort when a higher level of the negative or positive externality exists (i.e., higher  or ).
5Manufacturer is expected prot Ei in (4) is concave in her audit e¤ort ei because @
2Ei
@e2i
=  cx(x + 1)(1  
ei)
 x 2 < 0: Similarly, EBk in (5) and Ei;Bk in (6) are concave in eBk and ei, respectively.
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The former indicates that a manufacturer has an incentive to dedicate more resources in auditing
the supplier to keep the condence of consumers in the market, and the latter indicates that a
manufacturer has an incentive to improve her social responsibility when competition becomes more
intense. As expected, a manufacturer would reduce her audit e¤ort as the audit becomes more
costly (i.e., higher c and x) or the reliable backup supplier becomes more expensive (i.e., higher l).
From the suppliers prot given in (1), it is easy to see that the optimal probability of violation
(0)(ei) should satisfy one of the following three cases: (0)(ei) = 0 if the expected loss from violation
is larger than the cost saving from violation (i.e., r
P
i2N ei > g); 
(0)(ei) = 1 if the expected loss
is smaller than the saving; and (0)(ei) 2 [0; 1] if they are the same. To eliminate the uninteresting
cases in which the supplier always produces the part irresponsibly or always produces the part
responsibly regardless of manufacturersaudit e¤orts, we assume 1  
n
+(n 1) nl
cxn
o  1
x+1
> gnr ;
where the left-hand side of the inequality is a manufacturers optimal audit e¤ort when the supplier
always produces the part irresponsibly and can be obtained by substituting  = 1 into (7). Under
this condition,  = 0 or 1 can never be an equilibrium.6 Thus, the equilibrium probability of
violation (0) is between 0 and 1, and the equilibrium audit e¤ort e(0)i satises r
P
i2N e
(0)
i = g.
By substituting (7) into r
P
i2N e
(0)
i = g and solving for , we obtain the suppliers probability of
violation (0) as follows:
(0) =
cxn
+ (n  1)  nl

1  g
nr
 (x+1)
: (8)
One can verify that (0) is increasing in the audit cost parameters c and x, and the additional
backup cost l; while it is decreasing in the externality parameters  and . This is exactly opposite
to their respective impact on the manufacturers audit e¤ort e(0)i () in (7). Also, it is intuitive that
the supplier is more likely to produce his part irresponsibly when the cost saving from violation (g)
is higher or the loss of prot from the audit failure (r) is lower.
4.2 Analysis of the Two Cooperative Approaches
We analyze manufacturers incentives to cooperate by investigating the stable coalitions formed
by manufacturers. In §4.2.1, we introduce the basic denitions and stability concepts used in a
cooperative game in partition function form. In §4.2.2 and §4.2.3, we present the results under
joint auditing and information sharing, respectively.
4.2.1 Preliminary: A Cooperative Game in Partition Function Form
To form a coalition for joint auditing or information sharing, manufacturers need to negotiate how
to allocate the audit cost or the price of information, respectively. Without a proper allocation
scheme, manufacturers do not necessarily conduct a joint audit or share information with other
6See Appendix for the proof of this statement. A similar assumption is made in Babich and Tang (2012) wherein
a single manufacturer audits a supplier and no externalities exist.
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manufacturers. It is well-known that a cooperative game can be used to analyze multi-lateral
negotiations in such a setting (e.g., Brandenburger and Stuart 2007). The common approach that
has been used to analyze the formation of coalitions in the existing work reviewed in §2 is the use
of a cooperative game in ordinal function form. It is represented by the pair (N;w); in which N
is a set of players and w : 2N ! R is a characteristic function of the game. A subset S of N is
called a coalition, and N itself is the grand coalition. The characteristic function w(S) captures
the prot generated by a coalition S. In our model, however, the prot generated by coalition
S not only depends on the audit e¤orts of manufacturers in S, but also depends on the audit
e¤orts of manufacturers outside of S due to the negative and positive externalities. As a result, a
cooperative game in ordinal function form cannot be used in analyzing our model. Therefore, we
employ a di¤erent approach based on a cooperative game in partition function form that was rst
introduced by Thrall and Lucas (1963). For a comprehensive review of this cooperative game, see,
for example, Rayy and Vohraz (2014).
A cooperative game in partition function form is dened by (N;; fvBgB2); where  is a set of
all coalition structures, B = fB1; B2; :::; Bmg 2  is a coalition structure where m is the number of
coalitions in B; and vB is a partition function that associates each coalition Bk 2 B with the prot
it can generate, vB(Bk); where k = 1; 2; :::;m. The value of vB(Bk) depends on how manufacturers
outside Bk form coalitions; i.e., vB(Bk) and vB0(Bk) may be di¤erent if B 6= B0: Given a coalition
structure B = fB1; B2; :::; Bmg; an allocation is a payo¤ vector ' = f'1; '1; :::; 'ng, which species
how much of the prot generated by one coalition is attributed to each of its members. An allocation
is feasible under B if it satises
P
i2Bk 'i  vB(Bk) for k = 1; 2; :::;m: Let B denote a set of all
feasible allocations under B; and dene   S
B2
B:
In order to dene the stability concept for our analysis, we introduce a domination relation for
two allocations. Consider two allocations ' and '0 in  and a coalition S in N: We say that '
dominates '0 via S and denote ' domS '0 if the following two conditions hold: (i)
P
i2S 'i  vB(S)
for all B for which S 2 B, and (ii) 'i > '0i for all i 2 S: When ' domS '0; each member of S
receives a larger payo¤ under the feasible allocation ' than under the present allocation '0; and this
property holds true for any coalition formation among outsiders (i.e., for all B for which S 2 B).
In addition, we say that ' dominates '0 and denote ' dom '0 if there exists S  N such that '
domS '
0:
We use the notion of a core to analyze manufacturers incentives to cooperate through joint
auditing or information sharing. The core is a set of feasible allocations that are not dominated
by any other allocations, i.e., f' 2  j @'0 2  s:t: '0 dom 'g: In a cooperative game in ordinal
function form, a core allocation leads to a stable outcome in the sense that no subset of players has
an incentive to secede from the grand coalition. This interpretation of the core can be extended
to a cooperative game in partition function form as follows. Suppose vBN (N) 
mP
k=1
vB(Bk) for
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any B 2 ; where BN = fNg is the coalition structure that contains only the grand coalition.
This condition means that the total prot from all manufacturers is the largest when they form the
grand coalition. Then, any allocation ' that satises
P
i2N 'i > vBN (N) is not feasible, and any
allocation ' that satises
P
i2N 'i < vBN (N) is dominated via N by some feasible allocation. As a
result, any allocation ' in the core satises
P
i2N 'i = vBN (N); which means that a core allocation
attributes the prot generated by the grand coalition to each of its members. A core allocation is
not dominated by any other allocations, so any members of the grand coalition have no incentives
to secede from the grand coalition under a core allocation.
4.2.2 Incentives and E¤ectiveness of Joint Auditing
In this section, we rst derive the conditions under which stable coalition structures are formed
for joint auditing, and then examine the e¤ectiveness of joint auditing by comparing the suppliers
violation probability  with that in the base model without cooperation.
Manufacturers consider forming coalitions to audit the supplier jointly. For coalition Bk; where
k = 1; 2; :::;m, the partition function v(1)B (Bk) is dened as the total expected prot generated by
members of Bk. In order to obtain v
(1)
B (Bk); we rst compute the optimal joint audit e¤ort of
coalition Bk from the rst-order condition of (5) as follows:
e
(1)
Bk
() = 1 

nkfnk + (n  nk)  nlg
cxn
  1
x+1
: (9)
Since manufacturers in the same coalition share the cost of the joint audit, one may expect that
the optimal audit e¤ort should increase with the number of manufacturers in the coalition, nk.
However, observe from (9) that the optimal audit e¤ort e(1)Bk() may not necessarily increase with
nk. This is due to the existence of the positive externality: With more manufacturers in a coalition,
there are fewer manufacturers outside the coalition, and hence manufacturers in the coalition derive
the lower benet of ensuring high social responsibility from the positive externality. As a result,
having more manufacturers in a coalition does not guarantee a higher audit e¤ort of the coalition.
By substituting the optimal audit e¤ort e(1)Bk() into EBk in (5), we obtain the following
expected prot of coalition Bk:
v
(1)
B (Bk) =
X
i2Bk
i   nk
(

 
1 
Pm
h=1 nhe
(1)
Bh
n
!
+ 
 Pm
h=1 nhe
(1)
Bh
n
  e(1)Bk
!
+ e
(1)
Bh
l
)
  C(e(1)Bk):
(10)
In (10), the rst term is the sum of all manufacturersgross prots in Bk without social responsibility
violations, the second term captures the e¤ect of externalities on prots, and the third term is the
audit cost.
The following proposition presents the conditions under which the core is non-empty under
joint auditing. All proofs are provided in Appendix.
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Proposition 1 Suppose the audit cost is su¢ ciently high (i.e., 9tcost such that c  tcost) or the
negative externality dominates the positive externality (i.e., =  1): Then the core of cooper-
ative game (N;; fv(1)B gB2) under joint auditing is non-empty, and furthermore it contains the
egalitarian allocation 'Egi = i +
v
BN
(N) Pj2N j
n for all i 2 N .
The rst condition in Proposition 1 shows that when the audit cost is su¢ ciently high, manufactur-
ers have incentives to cooperate through joint auditing. This is intuitive because manufacturers in
a coalition share the joint audit cost. The second condition, which is less intuitive, shows that when
the negative externality dominates the positive externality, manufacturers also have incentives to
cooperate through joint auditing. To understand this result, we discuss two e¤ects of joint auditing
on the prots of manufacturers. On the one hand, joint auditing reduces the audit cost by pooling
resources. The reduced audit cost enables manufacturers to choose a higher audit e¤ort, which
increases the suppliers social responsibility level. This lowers a potential loss from the negative
externality. On the other hand, since manufacturers in one coalition face the same risk of social
responsibility violations being revealed, they do not benet from the positive externality of social
responsibility violations from other manufacturers in the same coalition. The former e¤ect creates
incentives for manufacturers to conduct audits jointly, whereas the latter e¤ect reduces such incen-
tives. Therefore, when the former e¤ect outweighs the latter e¤ect with high =, manufacturers
would cooperate through joint auditing.
Proposition 1 further shows that joint auditing can be implemented by using the egalitarian
allocation 'Eg, which allocates to manufacturers the audit cost as well as the loss or prot due to the
externalities from potential social responsibility violations. Note that the Shapley value, another
commonly used allocation in cooperative game theory, coincides with the egalitarian allocation in
our setting. This is because all manufacturers in a coalition make the same marginal contributions
to the coalitions audit cost and loss/prot from the externalities.
Having characterized the incentives of manufacturers to conduct joint audits, we now investigate
when joint auditing is e¤ective in improving social responsibility. Using e(1)Bk() in (9), we can
evaluate the suppliers violation probability (1) in equilibrium similarly to the base model without
cooperation. Although the closed-form expression for (1) does not always exist, we can still compare
(1) with (0) in (8) as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When m = 1; there exists a threshold (1) 2 (0; 1] such that joint auditing is more
e¤ective in improving social responsibility than individual auditing (i.e., (1)  (0)) if and only if
=  (1). When m > 1; there exists a threshold 0(1) 2 [0; (1)] such that joint auditing is more
e¤ective (i.e., (1)  (0)) if and only if =  0(1).
Contrary to the common belief that cooperation among rms helps improve social responsibility,
Proposition 2 shows that this is not necessarily true. Specically, when the grand coalition is formed
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in the market (i.e., m = 1) and the ratio of the negative externality to the positive externality
(=) is su¢ ciently small, joint auditing is less e¤ective in improving social responsibility than
individual auditing. The reason is that joint auditing lessens the intensity of competition among
manufacturers within a coalition by equalizing their levels of social responsibility. This reduced
competitive intensity, which is signicant when = is su¢ ciently small, drives down the joint
audit e¤ort, making joint auditing less e¤ective. Therefore, in a market that features high positive
externality or low negative externality (e.g., grocery market), governments and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) should closely monitor the audit e¤ort of a consortium.
Proposition 2 also suggests that the formation of multiple coalitions (i.e., m > 1) helps joint
auditing be more e¤ective. In this case, it is even possible that joint auditing is always more e¤ective
than individual auditing (i.e., 
0(1) = 0). This is because while universal cooperation under grand
coalition (i.e., m = 1) eliminates competition among manufacturers, competition among multiple
coalitions may still induce manufacturers to maintain high audit e¤orts. This means that the
formation of two coalitions such as the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh and
the Alliance of Bangladesh Worker Safety may be more e¤ective in improving social responsibility,
ceteris paribus, than the industrywide joint audit sought by Florida tomato industry (Boyd 2012).
This proposition has the following implications in relation to the two conditions given in Propo-
sition 1. First, when manufacturers cooperate simply to save high audit cost (see c  tcost in
Proposition 1), Proposition 2 suggests that such cooperation does not necessarily improve social
responsibility. The mere fact that an industry consortium is formed to jointly audit their suppliers
does not imply that it will improve social responsibility. Second, recall from Proposition 1 that
when =  1, manufacturers have incentives to conduct joint auditing. Since 0(1)  (1)  1 as
shown in Proposition 2, when =  1, joint auditing not only benets consumers by improving
social responsibility, but also benets manufacturers by increasing their expected prots; therefore,
joint auditing is a win-win solution for both consumers and manufacturers.
Lastly, note from (3) that, when = = 1; the negative externality o¤sets the positive ex-
ternality, so it is equivalent to a setting without externalities. In this special case, Propositions
1 and 2 imply that all manufacturers always have incentives to conduct joint auditing and that
joint auditing is always more e¤ective than individual auditing. Yet we do not observe such in-
dustrywide cooperation in many markets. Our results indicate that externalities are crucial to the
understanding of rmsincentives and e¤ectiveness of joint auditing.
4.2.3 Incentives and E¤ectiveness of Information Sharing
Suppose manufacturers consider sharing the information that they obtain from their individual
audits. Manufacturers can form coalitions at two di¤erent points in time: They can make these
decisions ex-ante before conducting their individual audits, or they can decide whether or not to
share the information ex-post after they observe their private signals about the supplier. We rst
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analyze the ex-ante information sharing and then analyze the ex-post information sharing.
Ex-ante Information Sharing Suppose manufacturers in coalition Bk (where k = 1; 2; :::;m)
agreed to share their audit results with each other ex-ante. We can dene the partition function
v
(2)
B (Bk) similar to joint auditing based on the expected prot of manufacturers in coalition Bk. To
obtain the expected prot, we consider manufacturer is e¤ort ei;Bk(; ej) in coalition Bk, given the
other manufacturerse¤ort in the same coalition, ej for j 2 Bknfig: From the rst-order condition
of Ei;Bk in (6), we obtain the following optimal e¤ort e
(2)
i;Bk
(; ej):
e
(2)
i;Bk
(; ej) = 1 
24
Y
j2Bkni
(1  ej)fnk + (n  nk)  nlg
cxn
35 
1
x+1
: (11)
From (11), one can see that the optimal audit e¤ort of manufacturer i is decreasing in the other
manufacturerse¤ort in the same coalition. This free-riding e¤ect of ex-ante information sharing
implies that a manufacturer devotes less resources in auditing the supplier when she expects her
partners in the same coalition to conduct more comprehensive audits. In the symmetric equilibrium
in which the audit e¤orts of manufacturers within the same coalition are the same, we can simplify
(11) into the following by substituting ej = e
(2)
i;Bk
:
e
(2)
i;Bk
() = 1 

fnk + (n  nk)  nlg
cxn
  1
x+nk
: (12)
The expected prot of Bk; v
(2)
B (Bk); can be obtained by substituting the optimal audit e¤ort e
(2)
i;Bk
()
into Ei;Bk given in (6). The following corollary presents the condition under which the core is
non-empty under ex-ante information sharing.
Corollary 1 If the negative externality dominates the positive externality (i.e., =  1), then the
core of cooperative game (N;; fv(2)B gB2) under ex-ante information sharing is non-empty, and
further it contains the egalitarian allocation 'Eg specied in Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 shows that when the negative externality dominates the positive externality (i.e., = 
1), it is more important for manufacturers to improve social responsibility of the entire market
than to gain a competitive advantage over others, so they have incentives to cooperate through
ex-ante information sharing. Recall from Proposition 1 that the same condition applies to joint
auditing. However, di¤erent from joint auditing, Corollary 1 implies that even if the audit cost
is su¢ ciently high, manufacturers do not necessarily have incentives to share information ex-ante.
This is expected because manufacturers do not share their audit costs while sharing their audit
results.
Next, we investigate when ex-ante information sharing improves social responsibility. Using
e
(2)
i;Bk
() given in (12), we can evaluate the suppliers violation probability (2) in equilibrium. As in
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joint auditing, the closed-form expression for (2) may not always exist. Yet we can still evaluate
the e¤ectiveness of ex-ante information sharing as compared to the base model without cooperation
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 There exists a threshold (2) 2 [0; 1] such that ex-ante information sharing is more
e¤ective in improving social responsibility than individual auditing (i.e., (2)  (0)) if and only if
=  (2). Furthermore, when g=r is su¢ ciently small, (2) > 0.
Proposition 3 suggests that information sharing may not always be e¤ective in improving social
responsibility. Under ex-ante information sharing, manufacturers have incentives to free-ride on
othersaudit e¤orts, so they may reduce their own audit e¤orts. Yet, it is not obvious whether
this free-ride e¤ect can outweigh the benet of shared information, and if so, when. In the absence
of externalities (i.e., = = 1), Proposition 3 suggests that the (negative) free-ride e¤ect never
dominates the (positive) benet of shared information, so that ex-ante information sharing is always
more e¤ective. In this case, ex-ante information sharing is always incentive-compatible (Corollary
1) and always more e¤ective. Unfortunately, this seems too ideal to be true, considering that
information sharing is not common in many markets. Thus, we need to examine how externalities
a¤ect the incentives and e¤ectiveness of ex-ante information sharing.
Under ex-ante information sharing, although manufacturers do not benet from the positive ex-
ternality of social responsibility violations from their partners (due to the same social responsibility
level in a coalition), they may still lose prots due to the negative externality when no manufac-
turers in a coalition identify the suppliers violation. Thus, when the negative externality  is low
relative to the positive externality , social responsibility has a less signicant impact on manufac-
turersprots under ex-ante information sharing than individual auditing without cooperation. In
this case, manufacturers reduce their individual audit e¤orts signicantly, and consequently ex-ante
information sharing becomes less e¤ective despite its information advantage.
Proposition 3 further reveals that as long as the suppliers cost saving from irresponsible pro-
duction is small or his prot from selling the part without violation is high (i.e., g=r is su¢ ciently
small), a su¢ ciently small ratio of = can make ex-ante information sharing less e¤ective than
individual auditing (i.e., (2) > 0). This is because when g=r is small, the audit e¤orts of manufac-
turers are low, and thus the value created by information sharing is limited. Whereas Proposition
2 shows that the formation of multiple coalitions (i.e., m > 1) makes joint auditing more e¤ective,
it is not always the case with ex-ante information sharing. This di¤erence implies that, because
of the free-ride e¤ect, competition among information-sharing coalitions may not be su¢ cient for
inducing high audit e¤orts from individual manufacturers.
When the negative externality dominates the positive externality (i.e., =  1), manufacturers
have incentives share information ex-ante to increase their own expected prots (Corollary 1), and
such sharing also benets consumers by improving social responsibility (Proposition 3). As a
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result, in this case, ex-ante information sharing is a win-win solution for both consumers and
manufacturers. This is consistent with joint auditing.
Lastly, we compare the e¤ectiveness of joint auditing and ex-ante information sharing. For
tractability, we assume a symmetric coalition structure under which the number of manufacturers
in every coalition is the same.
Corollary 2 Suppose the number of manufacturers in every coalition is the same (i.e., nk = n=m
for k = 1; 2; :::;m). Ex-ante information sharing is more e¤ective than joint auditing in improving
social responsibility (i.e., (1)  (2)) if and only if g=r  n
n
1   mn  nx(n m)o :
Corollary 2 shows that when the suppliers cost saving from violation (g) is su¢ ciently high or his
prot from selling the part without violation (r) is su¢ ciently low, ex-ante information sharing is
more e¤ective than joint auditing. In such a case, there is a stronger incentive for the supplier to
produce his part irresponsibly. Anticipating this, manufacturers choose higher audit e¤orts. This
makes audits more informative so that ex-ante information sharing, which leverages the value of
the information from individual audits, becomes more e¤ective.
Ex-post Information Sharing Suppose manufacturers did not cooperate through joint auditing
nor ex-ante information sharing. Then manufacturers conduct audits individually. After observing
their individual audit results, manufacturers now consider sharing their results with others. The
partition function v0(2)B (Bk) for manufacturers in coalition Bk can be dened as the sum of ex-post
prots given by
v
0(2)
B (Bk) =
X
i2Bk
i   nk



1 
Pm
h=1 nhI(Bh)
n

+ 
Pm
h=1 nhI(Bh)
n
  I(Bk)

+ I(Bk)l

;
(13)
where I(Bh) = 1 if there exists j 2 Bh such that sj = 1; and otherwise I(Bh) = 0. Note that
the audit cost is sunk after manufacturers obtain their results, and hence it is irrelevant to their
ex-post decisions about whether or not to cooperate.
When the supplier passed or failed every manufacturers audit, it is easy to see that the only
allocation in the core is the egalitarian allocation. A more interesting case is when the supplier
produced his part irresponsibly, passed at least one manufacturers audit, and failed at least one
manufacturers audit (i.e., a = 1; min
i2N
si = 0 and max
i2N
si = 1). In this case, some manufacturers may
have better information about the supplier than others. This is di¤erent from joint auditing or ex-
ante information sharing under which manufacturers in a coalition have the same information. In
this case, ex-post information sharing always improves social responsibility. Thus, in what follows,
we focus on the incentives of manufacturers to share their information ex-post by characterizing
the core of this game.
19
Proposition 4 Suppose a = 1; min
i2N
si = 0 and max
i2N
si = 1: Then;
(i) If   1; then the egalitarian allocation 'Eg is in the core of cooperative game (N;; fv
0(2)
B gB2).
If  < 1; then '
Eg is not in the core of cooperative game (N;; fv0(2)B gB2).
(ii) If n 22n 2   < 1 and only manufacturer i found the suppliers violation (i.e., si = 1), then the
following allocation is in the core: 'Uni = i+
n 1
n f(n 1)+g and 'Uni0 = i0  n 1n
n
+ n 1
o
for i0 2 Nnfig:
(iii) If n 22n 2   < 1 and more than one manufacturers found the suppliers violation or if  < n 22n 2 ;
then the core is empty.
Proposition 4 suggests that when ex-ante agreement is not reached for joint auditing or information
sharing, ex-post information sharing among manufacturers is still possible in some circumstances.
When the negative externality dominates the positive externality (i.e., =  1), Proposition
4(i) suggests that even if some manufacturers have better information about the suppliers social
responsibility level, they would share the information ex-post with others. Interestingly, they would
do so under the egalitarian allocation without any side payment from other manufacturers. Such
cooperation is possible when a manufacturers concern about social responsibility in the whole
market outweighs her concern about compromising an information advantage.
In contrast, when the negative externality does not dominate the positive externality (i.e.,
= < 1); manufacturers do not have incentives to share the information ex-post under the egal-
itarian allocation. However, we nd the allocation 'Un presented in Proposition 4(ii) (where the
superscript represents "unequal" allocation) is in the core if: (i) the suppliers violation is found by
only one manufacturer, and (ii) the ratio of the negative externality to the positive externality is
not very low (i.e., n 22n 2   < 1). This allocation requires the manufacturer with better informa-
tion to be compensated by other manufacturers. The amount of compensation is increasing with
the negative externality () because the information to be shared becomes more valuable as the
negative externality increases, and it is also increasing with the positive externality () because the
manufacturer with better information becomes more reluctant to share it as the positive externality
increases.
Lastly, Proposition 4(iii) presents two cases when the core is empty. First, when more than one
manufacturers have better information with = < 1, this information is redundant in the grand
coalition, so manufacturers may have incentives to form subcoalitions such that each subcoalition
has exactly one manufacturer with better information. In this case, the empty core may not be
an issue from a practical perspective because all manufacturers still have access to the information
about the suppliers violation. Moreover, the allocation given in Proposition 4(ii) can still be applied
to each subcoalition by replacing n with the number of manufacturers in the subcoalition. Second,
if the negative externality is very low or the positive externality is very high (i.e.,  <
n 2
2n 2); then
information sharing cannot be achieved ex-post without the intervention of a third party. This
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represents the case in which the compensation required by a manufacturer with better information
is so high that other manufacturers cannot a¤ord it. Therefore, the intervention of a third-party
organization such as a government agency or an industry association is necessary to facilitate ex-
post information sharing in this case. For this case, the following corollary shows the amount of
subsidies needed for information sharing.
Corollary 3 Suppose  <
n 2
2n 2 and there exists only one manufacturer i 2 N such that si = 1.
If n 1n f(n  2)  (2n  2)g (> 0) is paid to the grand coalition (i.e., v
00(2)
BN
(N) =
P
i2N i +
n 1
n f(n  2)  (2n  2)g and v
00(2)
B (Bk) = v
(2)
B (Bk) for B 6= BN ), then the core of cooperative
game (N;; fv00(2)B gB2) is always non-empty.
When there are more than one manufacturers with better information, a subsidy scheme similar
to the one in Corollary 3 can be applied to each subcoalition that has only one manufacturer with
better information.
5 Extension: A Sequential-Move Game
So far we have analyzed a simultaneous-move game between the supplier and manufacturers. A
similar model setup is used in the related literature (e.g., Babich and Tang 2012, Plambeck and
Taylor 2015), although prior work involves only one manufacturer. Yet, it is plausible that manu-
facturers and the supplier make their decisions sequentially. For example, manufacturers may have
a dominating market power over the supplier and thus lead the decisions (Caro et al. 2015), or
manufacturers may be able to commit to their audit e¤orts. In this section, we consider a sequential-
move game in which manufacturers rst decide on their audit e¤orts, and then the supplier makes
his compliance decision. All other model elements remain the same.
First, notice that partition functions v(1)B (Bk) and v
(2)
B (Bk) do not depend on the sequence
of decisions so the cooperative games remain unchanged. Therefore, the results in Proposition 1
and Corollary 1 about manufacturers incentives of collaboration for joint auditing and ex-ante
information sharing, respectively, continue to hold.
To investigate the e¤ectiveness of cooperation, we rst analyze the case without cooperation
using backward induction: We rst nd the optimal decision of the supplier and then those of
manufacturers. For any given audit e¤ort ei (i 2 N), we see from the expected prot of the
supplier given in (1) that if r
P
i2N ei > g; the violation of social responsibility can be prevented
completely (i.e., (0) = 0); if r
P
i2N ei < g ; the supplier always produces his product irresponsibly
(i.e., (0) = 1); and if r
P
i2N ei = g; the supplier is indi¤erent between the two options (i.e.,
(0) 2 [0; 1]). Anticipating the optimal decision of the supplier, manufacturer i determines the
optimal audit e¤ort e(0)i : When the supplier is indi¤erent, manufacturers can always increase their
audit e¤orts marginally to prevent the suppliers violation, so r
P
i2N e
(0)
i = g does not hold in
equilibrium. Thus, e(0)i is determined by comparing manufacturer is expected prot when 
(0) = 0
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and that when (0) = 1. In the symmetric equilibrium in which the audit e¤orts of manufacturers
are the same, e(0)i satises
e
(0)
i =
8><>:
g
nr + if Ei(ei =
g
nr ; 
(0) = 0)  Ei(ei = 1 
h
+(n 1) nl
cxn
i  1
x+1
; (0) = 1);
1 
h
+(n 1) nl
cxn
i  1
x+1
otherwise,
where  is an innitesimally small positive number and 1  
h
+(n 1) nl
cxn
i  1
x+1
is obtained by
substituting  = 1 into (7). Similarly, we can derive manufacturersoptimal audit e¤ort e(1)Bk under
joint auditing and e(2)i;Bk under ex-ante information sharing (see the proof of Corollary 4). By
comparing the suppliers probability of violation under these manufacturersaudit e¤orts, we can
derive the following result:
Corollary 4 There exists a threshold " 2 [0; 1] such that if =  "; both joint auditing and ex-
ante information sharing are less e¤ective in improving social responsibility than individual auditing
(i.e., (1)  (0) and (2)  (0)).
Consistent with Propositions 2 and 3, Corollary 4 shows that both joint auditing and ex-ante
information sharing may not always be e¤ective in improving social responsibility. Specically, when
the negative externality is low or the positive externality is high, collaboration among manufacturers
can hurt consumers by increasing the chance of social responsibility violations.
Finally, our results regarding ex-post information sharing are una¤ected with this change of a
sequence because this mode of collaboration considers sharing information ex-post after manufac-
turers have conducted their individual audits.
6 Conclusion
The incidents of social and environmental violations in recent years have compelled many rms
to rethink their approaches to managing suppliers. This paper investigates two cooperative ap-
proaches that are used in practice: auditing a common supplier jointly (joint auditing) and
sharing independent audit results with other rms (information sharing) either ex-ante or ex-
post. We investigate the incentives of competing rms to cooperate by analyzing a cooperative
game in partition function form, and examine when cooperation improves social responsibility in
supply chains.
Our analysis shows that the incentives for cooperation as well as the e¤ectiveness of cooperation
depend crucially on the externalities of social responsibility violations. On the one hand, the
violation of one rm may have a negative externality on the prot of other rms because consumers
may lose condence in all products in the market as a result of the violation. On the other hand, the
externality of such a violation can be positive if consumers switch from the manufacturer involved
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Figure 3: Incentive compatibility and e¤ectiveness of joint auditing, ex-ante information sharing,
and ex-post information sharing.
in the violation to others. The degree of these externalities has the following implications (see
Figure 3 for the summary):
(1) When the negative externality is high and/or the positive externality is low, manufacturers
have incentives to audit their common supplier jointly and to share their audit results with each
other. This is true even when some manufacturers have better information ex-post about the
supplier than others, and they would voluntarily share the information without any side payment
from other manufacturers because improving the social responsibility of the entire market is more
important than gaining competitive advantages over others. Both cooperative approaches can be
used to improve social responsibility in supply chains: Manufacturers can pool their resources
through joint auditing to conduct more comprehensive audits, and they can leverage the value of
information by sharing it with others. Yet, when the risk of violations is high, information sharing
is more e¤ective than joint auditing, and vice versa. Taken in sum, industry cooperation should be
encouraged in this case to achieve win-win outcomes for both consumers and manufacturers.
(2) When the negative externality is close to the positive externality, manufacturers have incentives
to conduct joint auditing if the audit cost is high, but they may not agree to share their private
information ex-ante. In this case, joint auditing can still be e¤ective in improving social responsibil-
ity when multiple coalitions are formed, and ex-ante information sharing can be e¤ective when the
risk of the suppliers violation is high. Even if ex-ante agreement is not reached for joint auditing
or information sharing, it is still possible to improve social responsibility by incentivizing manufac-
turers to share information ex-post through a side payment to those with better information. To
facilitate such cooperation, the side payment should be set larger when the degree of either positive
or negative externality are higher.
(3) When the negative externality is low and/or the positive externality is high, manufacturers
may still audit the supplier jointly if the audit cost is high, but they are unlikely to agree upon
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sharing information ex-ante. They have incentives to share information ex-post only with the
subsidy provided by a third-party organization. Although ex-post information sharing is e¤ective
in improving social responsibility, both joint auditing and ex-ante information sharing may not
improve social responsibility, potentially hurting consumers. This is because both approaches
reduce the intensity of competition, lowering manufacturersincentives to exert high audit e¤orts
in order to gain competitive advantages.
Although manufacturers cooperated voluntarily in the case of the Bangladesh res and in the
pharmaceutical industry, a third-party organization such as a government agency or an industry
association should intervene in other cases to motivate cooperation, for example, in addressing the
environmental violations which involved Apple, HP, and Sony. Because industry cooperation does
not necessarily improve social responsibility, caution must be taken to monitor manufacturersaudit
e¤orts, especially when cooperative approaches are implemented in the market where competition
is erce and consumers switch easily. The careful assessment of the risk and externalities associated
with social responsibility violations is a key to the success of joint auditing and information sharing.
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Appendix
Equilibrium violation probability: We prove in the following that  = 0 or 1 can never be an
equilibrium when 1 
n
+(n 1) nl
cxn
o  1
x+1
> gnr : To see that  = 0 cannot be an equilibrium, one
can observe from (4) that e(0)i () = 0 when  = 0; whereas 
(0)(0) = 1 from (1). Similarly,  = 1
cannot be an equilibrium because e(0)i () = 1  
n
+(n 1) nl
cxn
o  1
x+1  e from (7) when  = 1;
whereas (0)(e) = 0 due to the assumption that 1  
n
+(n 1) nl
cxn
o  1
x+1
> gnr : Therefore,  = 0
or 1 can never be an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1: First, we verify vBN (N) 
mP
k=1
vB(Bk) for any B 2 : From (10),
vBN (N) =
P
i2N i   n

1  e(1)N

  nle(1)N   c(1   e(1)N ) x 
P
i2N i   n

1  e(1)Bmax

 
nle
(1)
Bmax
 c(1 e(1)Bmax) x 
P
i2N i 
mP
k=1

nk

1 
Pm
h=1 nhe
(1)
Bh
n

+ nkle
(1)
Bk
+ c(1  e(1)Bk) x

=
mP
k=1
vB(Bk); where e
(1)
N is the optimal audit e¤ort of the grand coalition N under BN and e
(1)
Bmax
=
26
max
h
e
(1)
Bh
: The rst inequality is due to the optimality of e(1)N given B
N and the second inequality
follows from the denition of e(1)Bmax and   l:
Next, we prove that if (i) c  tcost or (ii) =  1; then manufacturers in S  N have no
incentives to secede from the grand coalition N; by comparing the allocation to S under B with
that under BN : Suppose coalition structure B satises B = argmin
B03S
vB0(S): We consider allocation
' with
P
i2S 'i = vB(S) such that it is the largest allocation that satises
P
i2S 'i  vB0(S) for all
B0 3 S. From (10), the allocation to S under BN satisesPi2S 'Egi =Pi2S i ns1  e(1)N  
nsle
(1)
N   nsn c(1   e
(1)
N )
 x  Pi2S i   ns1  e(1)S    nsle(1)S   nsn c(1   e(1)S ) x; where ns is
the number of manufacturers in S; e(1)S is the optimal audit e¤ort of coalition S under B; and the
inequality is due to the optimality of e(1)N given BN . Similarly, the allocation to S under B satisesP
i2S 'i =
P
i2S i ns



1 
Pm
k=1 nke
(1)
Bk
n

+ 
Pm
k=1 nke
(1)
Bk
n   e
(1)
S

+ le
(1)
S

 c(1 e(1)S ) x:
Then, by solving
P
i2S i   ns

1  e(1)S

  nsle(1)S   nsn c(1   e
(1)
S )
 x  Pi2S 'i; we obtain
c  ns(1   nsn ) 1(1   e
(1)
S )
x(   )
Pm
k=1 nke
(1)
Bk
n   e
(1)
S

 tcost: Therefore, if c  tcost; thenP
i2S '
Eg
i 
P
i2S 'i so that S has no incentives to secede from the grand coalition.
Similarly, for condition (ii), we consider coalition structure B which minimizes vB(S) and
allocation ' with
P
i2S 'i = vB(S): Note from (9) that when

  1; vB(S) is increasing in e
(1)
Bk
and
e
(1)
Bk
is increasing in nk: Thus, except S, every coalition Bk in B includes only one manufacturer
(i.e., nk = 1). Then, we obtain
P
i2S '
Eg
i  
P
i2S 'i  ns(   )

e
(1)
S  
Pm
k=1 nke
(1)
Bk
n

 0: 
Proof of Proposition 2: By substituting e(1)Bk() in (9) into r
Pm
k=1 nke
(1)
Bk
() = g, we obtain the
following equation that (1) satises:
r
mX
k=1
nk
241  "(1)nkfnk + (n  nk)  nlg
cxn
#  1
x+1
35 = g: (14)
Since the left-hand side of (14) is increasing in (1); when r
Pm
k=1 nk

1 
h
(0)nkfnk+(n nk) nlg
cxn
i  1
x+1

 g; (1)  (0): By substituting (1) in the left-hand side of (14) with (0) = cxn+(n 1) nl
 
1  gnr
 (x+1),
we obtain r
Pm
k=1 nk

1  (1  gnr )X
  1
x+1
k

; where Xk =
nkfnk+(n nk) nlg
+(n 1) nl : When Xk  1 for
k = 1; 2; :::;m; r
Pm
k=1 nk

1  (1  gnr )X
  1
x+1
k

 rPmk=1 nk 1  (1  gnr ) = rPmk=1 nkgnr = g: By
solving Xk  1 for  ; we obtain that   1 + nnk+1(
l
   1):
When m = 1, dene (1) = 1 + nn+1(
l
   1). One can see that (1) 2 (0; 1] because   l:
If   (1); then Xk  1 and r
Pm
k=1 nk

1  (1  gnr )X
  1
x+1
k

 rPmk=1 nkgnr = g: Similarly, if
r
Pm
k=1 nk

1  (1  gnr )X
  1
x+1
k

 g, then Xk  1 so   (1). Therefore, (1)  (0) if and only if

  (1).
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When m > 1; dene 
(1)
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f1+ nnk+1(
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( l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increasing in Xk: Further, Xk is increasing in

 : Thus, there exists 
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Proof of Corollary 1: The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1 and is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3: By substituting e(2)i;Bk() in (12) into r
Pm
k=1 nke
(2)
i;Bk
() = g, we obtain
the following equation that (2) satises:
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Proof of Corollary 2: Under a symmetric coalition structure, we obtain (1) = cxnnk[nk+(n nk) nl] 
1  gnr
 (x+1) by solving e(1)Bk() = gnr similar to the base model. We obtain (2) = cxnnk+(n nk) nl 
1  gnr
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Proof of Proposition 4: From (13), we can see that v0
BN
(N) 
mP
k=1
v0B(Bk) for any B 2 . In
what follows, we prove in (i) and (ii) that manufacturers in S  N have no incentives to secede
from the grand coalition N if   1 and 'Eg is used, or if n 22n 2   < 1 and 'Un is used. Lastly,
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we prove in (iii) that manufacturers always have incentives to secede if n 22n 2   < 1 and more
than one manufacturers found the suppliers violation, or if  <
n 2
2n 2 .
(i) From (13),
P
i2S '
Eg
i =
P
i2S i: We rst prove that any coalition S, whose members fail to
detect social responsibility risk (i.e., si = 0 for all i 2 S), has no incentive to secede from the grand
coalition N: For such a coalition S; since   1;
P
i2S 'i =
P
i2S i   ns
n


1 
Pm
k=1 nkI(Bk)
n

+
Pm
k=1 nkI(Bk)
n
o
 Pi2S i = Pi2S 'Egi : Next, we show that coalition S with at least one
manufacturer who has detected social responsibility risk has no incentive to secede from the grand
coalition N as well. For such a coalition S;
P
i2S 'i =
P
i2S i   ns(   )

1 
Pm
k=1 nkI(Bk)
n

P
i2S i =
P
i2S '
Eg
i , where the inequality holds because

  1. On the contrary, when  < 1;P
i2S 'i >
P
i2S i =
P
i2S '
Eg
i for coalition S with at least one manufacturer who has detected
social responsibility risk, so 'Eg is not in the core.
(ii) We rst consider coalition S such that i =2 S: Under 'Un;Pj2S 'Unj = Pj2S j   nsn f(n  
1) + g: Similar to the proof of Proposition 1, we consider coalition structure B which mini-
mizes v0B(S) and allocation ' with
P
j2S 'j = v
0
B(S): Since

 < 1; the coalition structure B
that minimizes v0B(S) should have the highest social responsibility level. This can be achieved by
letting all manufacturers that are not in S form one coalition (i.e., m = 2). Thus,
P
j2S 'j =P
j2S j   nsn fns + (n  ns)g <
P
j2S '
Un
j because

 < 1: Next, for coalition S such that
i 2 S;Pj2S 'Unj =Pj2S j+  1  nsn  fn+ g: Yet,Pj2S 'j =Pj2S j+( )  1  nsn  =P
j2S '
Un
j   
 
1  nsn

n <
P
j2S '
Un
j :
(iii) We rst prove that when  < 1; the core is empty when there exists another manufacturer
j (6= i) such that sj = 1: On the one hand, the allocation ' that is not dominated via fi; jg
satises 'i + 'j  i + j + 2
 
1  2n

(   ) > i + j ; where the rst inequality is because
'i+'j  vB(fi; jg) for all B for which fi; jg 2 B from the denition of domination and the second
inequality holds because  < 1: On the other hand, the allocation ' that is not dominated via
Nni satises Pz2Nni 'z Pz2Nni z because Pz2Nni 'z  vB(Nni) for all B for which Nni 2 B
from the denition of domination. Then, we obtain
P
z2N 'z =
P
z2Nni 'z+'i >
P
z2N z; which
means that ' is not feasible. Therefore, the core is empty.
Next, we prove that when  <
n 2
2n 2 ; the core is empty even when there exists only one
manufacturer i such that si = 1: Similar to the case above, according to the denition of domina-
tion, the allocation ' that is not dominated via Nni satises Pz2Nni 'z  Pz2Nni z   (n  
1)
n

 
1  1n

+ n
o
: Suppose j 2 Nni so that sj = 0: The allocation ' that is not domi-
nated via Nnj satises Pz2Nnj 'z  Pz2Nnj z + n 1n (   ) according to the denition of
domination. Then, we obtain
P
z2N 'z = j +
1
n 1
P
z2Nni 'z  
P
z2Nni z

+
P
z2Nnj 'z 
j   
 
1  1n
  n +Pz2Nnj z + n 1n (   ) =Pz2N z   2  1  1n+ n 2n >Pz2N z;
where the last inequality holds because  <
n 2
2n 2 : Thus, ' is not feasible, so the core is empty. 
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Proof of Corollary 3: We prove that when  <
n 2
2n 2 ; the following allocation is in the core:
'Subi = i +
n  1
n
f(n  1) + g+ n  1
n
f(n  2)  (2n  2)g and
'Subi0 = i  
n  1
n
f+ 
n  1g for i
0 2 Nni:
First, consider coalition S such that i =2 S. For any allocation ' to dominate 'Sub via S,P
z2S 'z 
P
z2S z   ns


 
1  n nsn

+ 
 
n ns
n
	 Pz2S z   ns   1  1n+    1n	 =P
z2S '
Sub
z ; where the rst inequality is due to the denition of domination and the second in-
equality is due to  <
n 2
2n 2 : For coalition S with i 2 S; if any allocation ' dominates 'Sub
via S, then
P
z2S 'z  
P
z2S '
Sub
z 
P
z2S z   ns


 
1  nsn

+ 
 
ns
n   1
	  Pz2S 'Subz =
(n  ns)

ns 1
n    ns 1+nn 
	  n 1n  f(n  2)   (2n  2)g  0; where the rst inequality is due
to the denition of domination and the second inequality is due to 1  ns  n  1 and  < n 22n 2 :
Therefore, S has no incentives to secede from the grand coalition and 'Sub is in the core. 
Proof of Corollary 4: Manufacturersoptimal audit e¤orts e(1)Bk under joint auditing and e
(2)
i;Bk
under ex-ante information sharing are as follows:
e
(1)
Bk
=
8>>>><>>>>:
g
nr + if EBk(eBk =
g
nr ;  = 0) 
EBk(eBk = 1 
h
nkfnk+(n nk) nlg
cxn
i  1
x+1
;  = 1);
1 
h
nkfnk+(n nk) nlg
cxn
i  1
x+1
otherwise,
e
(2)
i;Bk
=
8>>>><>>>>:
1  nk
q
1  gnr + if Ei;Bk(ei;Bk = 1  nk
q
1  gnr ;  = 0) 
Ei;Bk(ei;Bk = 1 
h
nk+(n nk) nl
cxn
i  1
x+nk ;  = 1);
1 
h
nk+(n nk) nl
cxn
i  1
x+nk otherwise.
We rst prove that there exists "(1) such that if =  "(1); (1)  (0). Given  = 0 or 1
in equilibrium, when (1) = 1; (1)  (0) always holds. So we need to show that when (1) = 0,
(0) = 0 if =  "(1): Suppose =  min
k
f1+ nnk+1(
l
 1)g: According to the proof of Proposition
2, in this case, nkfnk+(n nk) nlg+(n 1) nl  1 and thus eBk  1  
h
nkfnk+(n nk) nlg
cxn
i  1
x+1  1  h
+(n 1) nl
cxn
i  1
x+1  ei :When (1) = 0; EBk(eBk = gnr ;  = 0)  EBk(eBk = eBk ;  = 1): From
(5), we obtain  C( gnr )   nk

1 
Pm
h=1 nhe

Bh
n

+nk

eBk  
Pm
h=1 nhe

Bh
n

 nkeBk l C(eBk):
By solving  nk

1 
Pm
h=1 nhe

Bh
n

+nk

eBk  
Pm
h=1 nhe

Bh
n

 nkeBk l   

1 
P
j2N e

j
n

+


ei  
P
j2N e

j
n

 ei l; we obtain = 
h
nke

Bk
 Ak   l(nkeBk   ei )
i h
nk  Ak   1 +
P
j2N e

j
n
i 1
;
whereAk =
nk
Pm
h=1 nhe

Bh
n : Therefore, if =  mink
n
1 + nnk+1(
l
   1);
h
nke

Bk
 Ak   l(nkeBk   ei )
i
h
nk  Ak   1 +
P
j2N e

j
n
i 1
 "(1); we have the following inequalities when (1) = 0;
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 C( gnr )   nk

1 
Pm
h=1 nhe

Bh
n

+ nk

eBk  
Pm
h=1 nhe

Bh
n

  nkeBk l   C(eBk)
  

1 
P
j2N e

j
n

+ 

ei  
P
j2N e

j
n

  ei l   C(eBk)
  

1 
P
j2N e

j
n

+ 

ei  
P
j2N e

j
n

  ei l   C(ei );
so Ei(ei =
g
nr ;  = 0)  Ei(ei = ei ;  = 1) and (0) = 0: It is easy to see that "(1)  1 because
  l:
The proof for the existence of a threshold "(2) for (2)  (0) is similar to that of "(1) and is
hence omitted. Dene " = minf"(1); "(2)g: Then (1)  (0) and (2)  (0) if   ": 
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